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 The evolution of world agricultural 
trade since year 2000 
1. Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, world 
agricultural markets have evolved significantly. Strong 
economic growth in emerging and developing economies 
has driven the demand for agricultural products globally. 
Global production increased to meet demand, while trade 
expanded substantially. Between the years 2000 and 
2018 world agricultural trade increased almost 250 per-
cent in value and 95 percent in volume, while world gross 
domestic product grew 60 percent in the same period. 
Agricultural trade increased its share of total world trade 
from 6% to 8%, rising to nearly US$ 2,000 billion in 2018.
2. Since the financial and economic crisis of 2008, agricul-
tural trade has been more resilient than non-agricultural 
trade, which has slowed due to a reduction in investment 
and the resultant weak aggregate demand. Consequently, 
the value of world non-agricultural trade has expanded 
165 percent since the year 2000. This is well below the 
corresponding figure for world agricultural trade, which 
was less affected by changes in investment behavior and 
was more directly related to population growth and in-
come change.
3. The greater expansion of the value of world agricultural 
trade compared to the volume can be explained by in-
creasing prices of agricultural products since 2000, as 
well as the 2008 and the 2011 price surges. Changes in 
volume and prices were the result of structural changes 
in global agricultural markets, e.g. strong demand for 
food and feed; declining stock-to-use ratios; expanding 
production of biofuels; changes in consumption patterns 
in developing economies; the increasing importance of 
emerging economies in global agricultural markets; rapid 
growth of South–South agricultural trade, among the key 
factors.
4. Similar trends in agricultural trade can be observed in the 
APEC region and also in the countries that IICA represents. 
While APEC agricultural exports to the world increased 
around 235 percent between 2000 and 2018, agricultural 
exports by IICA countries grew 240 percent. Both groups 
of economies have a significant share of world agricultural 
trade: 36 percent for APEC and 30 percent for IICA countries. 
These shares were stable during the period of almost two 
decades. Both groupings have economies in the list of top ten 
exporters of agricultural products as well as in the list of top 
ten importers of these goods.
5. It is interesting to note that while APEC agricultural prod-
ucts’ share of total world exports remained stable—around 
5 - 6 percent during the 2000 – 2018 period—in the case 
of IICA countries, agricultural exports’ share of total exports 
increased from 8 percent in 2000 to 13 percent in 2018, 
suggesting that in the Americas, the relative importance of 
agricultural products’ share of total exports grew during the 
period. On the other hand, while APEC economies accounted 
for half of the world trade of nonagricultural products dur-
ing the period, the corresponding share for IICA countries is 
currently less that one fifth, decreasing 5 percentage points 
between 2000 and 2018.
 Agricultural policy trends and WTO 
negotiations
6. The expansion of agricultural trade since 2000 was facili-
tated by improvements in market access as a result of the 
1995 WTO Agreement on Agriculture. Average applied tariff 
levels declined as economies met their commitments under 
the Agreement, but also as a result of bilateral and regional 
trade agreements and unilateral policy changes during these 
two decades. Trade-distorting domestic support has also 
fallen since the year 2000, for example market price sup-
port or payments coupled with output and input subsidies. 
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In addition, there has been a significant reduction in the 
use of export subsidies, facilitated by the higher level of 
agricultural commodity prices during the period.
7. Nevertheless, on average, agriculture faces much higher 
trade barriers than manufacturing. Agricultural products in 
recent years still face average import tariffs of around 16% 
compared to 4% for industrial goods. Moreover, some agri-
cultural commodities often face much higher tariffs in coun-
tries where these commodities are considered sensitive. 
8. Progress in agricultural negotiations in the framework of 
the WTO has stalled. Since the second half of 2018, WTO 
members have engaged in an intensive cycle of consulta-
tions and meetings, resulting in a work plan that envis-
ages seven thematic working groups to focus on all areas 
of the negotiations: domestic support (subsidies), public 
stockholding for food security purposes, cotton, market 
access, the special safeguard mechanism, export compe-
tition and export restrictions. The aim is to intensify and 
deepen discussions and move the agriculture talks to a 
“solution-finding” phase, in anticipation of the 12th Min-
isterial Conference, to be held in June 2020 in Nur-Sultan, 
Kazakhstan, as a possible conclusion to discussions on 
some of the issues being negotiated.
9. Discussions on public stockholding for food security contin-
ued in dedicated sessions. At issue are public stockpiles of 
food acquired at administered (officially set) prices. Some 
members are concerned about the potentially negative 
impact that these programs might have internationally, as 
overstocked food could be sold at cheaper prices in global 
markets and cause trade distortion. It was suggested that 
so-called green box farm support—support that is allowed 
without limits, because it does not distort trade, or at most 
causes minimal distortion—already offers a range of policy 
options for addressing food security challenges. Other econ-
omies emphasize the significant number of small farmers in 
developing economies, their vulnerability and the prevalence 
of poverty in rural areas. Many members from developing 
countries lent their support to the G33 proposal, which re-
iterates the need to fulfill the Bali and Nairobi mandates to 
reach a permanent solution that would cover both existing 
and new public stockholding programs and that would be 
applicable to all developing economies, without additional 
burdensome requirements. Considering that the deadline to 
achieve a permanent solution at the 11th Ministerial Confer-
ence was missed, members should aim for agreement at the 
Nur-Sultan Ministerial Conference. Appropriate safeguards 
acceptable to all and enhanced transparency provisions 
seem to be essential components of any permanent solution.
10. WTO members underscore the importance attached to the 
negotiations on domestic support. Some members insist 
that negotiations should initially focus on the aggregate 
measurement of support (AMS) entitlements, which permit 
certain members to exceed their de minimis levels (minimal 
amounts of domestic support that are allowed even though 
they distort trade) under the Agreement on Agriculture. They 
consider this to be the most trade-distorting form of sup-
port, while others express the view that all components of 
trade-distorting support should be examined in the negotia-
tions. Members continue to stress the need to further limit 
trade-distorting domestic support, but they differ sharply on 
how. Several members call for “proportional contribution”, 
meaning that members creating the most distortion to trade 
should also contribute more in their domestic support re-
duction. The need for special and differential treatment is 
underscored by many developing economies, who point to 
the specific challenges they face, including rural poverty and 
food security. The specific needs of least-developed coun-
tries (LDCs), small, vulnerable economies (SVEs) and net 
food-importing developing economies is also mentioned. 
Thus far, the views put forward to address domestic support 
are centered on existing limits and entitlements; new limits 
and disciplines, such as overall limits or product-specific dis-
ciplines and consideration of more disaggregated informa-
tion, such as support by farmer or by hectare, for example.
11. WTO members are engaged in substantive technical dis-
cussions on market access (essentially tariffs). These 
include the large difference between members’ applied 
tariffs – those that are actually levied – and bound tariffs, 
which are the maximum an individual member is permitted 
under its schedule of commitments. The commitments of 
newly acceded members and the erosion of preferences 
are also being discussed, that is, the possible impact that 
reductions in tariff rates have on the advantages granted 
to developing economies under preferential tariff systems. 
Members continue their review of the Bali Ministerial Deci-
sion on tariff rate quotas (TRQs). Exchanges focus on ad-
dressing the causes of chronic TRQ underfill. Duties inside 
a quota are usually lower, often significantly lower, than 
those applied outside the quota. Unfilled quotas mean that 
exporters miss out. Some economies emphasize the need 
for a clearer outlining of procedures regarding TRQ real-
location requirements to address cases of quota underfill. 
A number of members express reservations about the tar-
geting of country-specific TRQs and are of the opinion that 
those TRQs are not covered by the Bali TRQ decision and 
the underfill mechanism.
12. WTO members continue to discuss a special safeguard 
mechanism (SSM), as instructed by the 10th Ministerial 
Conference. Many economies stress the socio-economic 
context affecting agriculture in developing economies 
and the price volatility risks associated with international 
trade. A special safeguard mechanism would allow de-
veloping economies to raise tariffs temporarily to address 
import surges or price slumps. Some members envisage 
such a mechanism only in the context of market access 
reforms, while proponents see no necessary linkage. 
Two main challenges remain with respect to this issue: 
to achieve the required degree of technical maturity in 
the SSM discussions and to address the market access-
related concerns of the exporting members.
13. Regarding export prohibitions and restrictions, many 
members make reference to the work undertaken before 
the Buenos Aires Ministerial Conference in 2017 and re-
iterate their support for an outcome on this topic, while 
a few developing economies express concern that new 
requirements or restrictions could limit their policy space. 
Several members strongly advocate reaching a decision 
with regard to granting a possible export restriction ex-
emption to the World Food Program for humanitarian aid.
14. The area of export competition covers export subsidies, 
export credits, export credit guarantees or insurance pro-
grams, international food aid and agricultural exporting 
state trading enterprises. Several members express an in-
terest in continuing to look at ways to improve disciplines 
on export measures with equivalent effect, agreed by min-
isters in Nairobi. Many members highlight persistent data 
gaps in export finance, exporting STEs and food aid, stress-
ing the need to fill these gaps to enable a better assessment 
of possible ways the current disciplines could be improved. 
Many members point to the need to focus as a first step on 
how to enhance transparency to properly monitor and pos-
sibly improve disciplines on export competition.
15. The Cotton-4 economies—Mali, Chad, Benin and Burkina 
Faso (as well as Côte d’Ivoire, an observer since November 
2018)—stress the importance of reaching an outcome on 
cotton subsidies by the next Ministerial Conference, to meet 
a commitment by WTO members to address cotton “ambi-
tiously, expeditiously and specifically within the agriculture 
negotiations”. Many members express their support for 
this objective, but there are stark differences in their ap-
proaches to advancing work on this issue. Benin, on behalf 
of the Cotton-4, introduced a new proposal, including a plan 
to reduce trade-distorting cotton subsidies in incremental 
steps, between 1 January 2021 and 31 December 2025.
16. Three types of possible outcomes for the negotiation phase 
on agriculture are envisaged: a) an outcome on strengthen-
ing transparency, which is a topic brought up most frequently 
across all areas of agriculture; b) some limited incremental but 
also substantive outcome on selected topics, such as cotton, 
public stockholding, some elements in domestic support and 
market access; and c) a broader and more balanced, multi-
topic package with an outcome across all agriculture issues. 
 The present and future agricultural 
trade landscape  
17. According to WTO, world trade growth will continue to lose 
momentum during 2019, as trade tensions remain high and 
GDP growth weakens in major economies. The uncertainty 
about trade policy is likely to reduce investment and to im-
pact negatively on world trade and output.
18. WTO monitoring reports show that WTO members continued 
to apply new trade-restrictive measures during recent months 
through tariff increases, imports bans, special safeguards, im-
port taxes and export duties. The trade coverage for the new 
import-restrictive measures is estimated at almost US$ 340 
billion, the second highest figure on record, after the reported 
peak of US$ 600 during the second half of 2018. Together, 
these two periods demonstrate a dramatic spike in the trade 
coverage of import-restrictive measures. Thus, trade flows are 
being hit by trade restrictions at a historically high level. Ad-
ditionally, several significant trade-restrictive measures will 
either be implemented shortly, during the remaining part of 
2019, or will remain under consultation for potential imple-
mentation at a later time. These facts suggest that the precari-
ous situation in global trade will persist, adding to the uncer-
tainty surrounding international trade and the world economy.
19. World agricultural trade is not an exception to this overall 
situation. Notifications of WTO members’ agricultural trade 
measures more than doubled in comparison to 2017, with 
serious concerns raised about members’ notified domestic 
support measures. Trade concerns have also been raised 
about the bulk of Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) notifica-
tions. The majority of regular SPS notifications are related 
to food safety, whereas a substantial number of emergency 
SPS measures are related to animal health. Consequently, 
the number of specific trade concerns has increased sub-
stantially in the WTO SPS Committee.
20. Economies and cooperation institutions have the opportunity, 
in this case, to facilitate trade through regulatory cooperation. 
Many obligations of the SPS Agreement, most notably those 
related to notification, play an essential role in fostering op-
portunities for regulatory cooperation between members and 
in enabling the private sector and other interested stakehold-
ers to stay informed and to adapt to regulatory frameworks. 
These transparency obligations therefore provide opportunities 
for cooperation at various stages of the domestic regulatory 
process. Cooperation creates opportunities for discussion and 
negotiation on the content of the measure, and for receiving 
a wider range of input to strengthen the evidence base upon 
which a regulation should be established. This creates a vir-
tuous cycle, which ultimately can improve regulatory quality.
21. The future of food and agriculture also faces uncertainties 
that give rise to serious questions. The United Nations World 
Population Prospects medium-fertility variant forecasts that 
the global population will exceed 10 billion by 2055, stabilizing 
at just over 11 billion by the 22nd century. This implies that 
the global population peak will occur within the next century. 
Alternatively, the high-fertility variant suggests that the global 
population will more than double by 2100 and continue to in-
crease, while the low-fertility variant predicts the population 
will peak by mid-century, before falling to near its current level. 
This is a variance of 9.3 billion people (in 2100) between the 
high- and low-fertility scenarios, highlighting the potential un-
certainty in the future demand for food.
22. It is also expected that as incomes increase, demand pref-
erences for food will change. Consumption of meat and 
dairy products is expected to grow over the next century, to 
satisfy a demand for protein in today’s lower income coun-
tries. Such a demand, however, will place additional strain 
on land-use and greenhouse gas inventories, as livestock 
production is generally more land- and emission-intensive 
than the equivalent crop production. 
23. On the supply side, the key factor affecting the ability of the 
agriculture sector to respond to these changes in demand 
is productivity growth. Risks include the spread of diseases, 
growing resistance to antimicrobial substances, regulatory 
responses to new plant breeding techniques and responses 
to increasingly likely extreme climatic events. Thus, the neg-
ative impact of anthropogenic climate change on agriculture 
is expected to intensify over the next century. This impact will 
include changes in crop-growing regions and an increase 
in severe weather events. The implementation of climate 
change mitigation policies would also impact agricultural 
production. This will create another level of uncertainty that 
will shape agriculture over the next century. 
24. Thus, food and agriculture systems may follow alternative 
pathways, depending on a variety of factors such as popula-
tion growth, dietary choices, technological progress, income 
distribution, the state and use of natural resources and cli-
matic changes. These pathways can and will be impacted 
by strategic choices and policy decisions that should be the 
result of a cooperative game at the multinational level.
25. Sustainably expanding the supply of food in economies 
whose population is expected to increase significantly is 
essential to ensure adequate food availability. Trade has 
an important role to play here and imports may well be 
needed to fill domestic deficits, in the event that natural 
resource constraints are an issue. Strong global and na-
tional institutions are needed to coordinate efforts across 
countries. International trade will remain essential for food 
security in a growing number of food importing countries. 
26. In all scenarios, international trade will play a key role in 
ensuring world food availability in various regions. In this 
context, the role of cooperation, either through country 
groupings like APEC or institutions like IICA, will be funda-
mental to deal with the present and future uncertainties in 
international agricultural trade, in particular, and in world 
agricultural markets, in general.
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